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ABSTRACT 
 
The Political Economy of Iran-U.S. Relations: Economic Sanctions 
 
By 
 
S.M.Mehdee Araee 
 
 
Relations between Iran and the United States have disrupted since the revolution in Iran. 
Before the Revolution with the Shah, the United States was Iran's foremost economic and 
military partner, thus participating greatly in the rapid modernization of its infrastructure 
and industry with as many as thirty thousand American expatriates residing in the country 
in a technical, consulting, or teaching capacity. Iranian people have traditionally been 
highly sensitive and suspicious of foreign interference in their country. The United States 
have had many interventions and roles in Iran since 1953 when the U.S. and Great Britain 
overthrew Iran's democratically elected Premier Mohammad Mossadeq as part of a plan 
to insure access to Iranian oil. Commercial relations between Iran and the United States 
are restricted by U.S. sanctions.  
Obstacles from the U.S. perspective can be noted as state sponsorship of international 
terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, threats to neighbors in the Persian 
Gulf, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and violations of human rights. On 
Iran's side, The United States should accept the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution, it 
doesn't have any right to interfere in Iran's internal affairs, and should deals with the 
Iranian regime on the basis of "respect and equality." 
Over a period of twenty years, U.S. sanctions on Iran have had a significant economic 
cost for the U.S. as well as for Iran. Direct merchandise trade between the U.S. and Iran 
has declined significantly, but the real cost of sanctions to each country is not a result of 
reduced bilateral trade, since much of this trade has been diverted to third countries. 
While sanctions have impacted direct bilateral merchandise trade (largely losses in 
foreign exchange only), the non-trade impact of sanctions, which will continue to accrue 
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even after sanctions are lifted, appears to be much more important because it represents a 
real cost to both sides. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
It is obvious that Iran is home to one of the world's oldest continuous major civilizations, 
with historical and urban settlements dating back to 4000 BC. Throughout history, Iran 
has been of geostrategic importance because of its central location in Eurasia and is a 
regional power. Iran is a founding member of the UN, NAM, OIC, and OPEC. However, 
the foreign relations of Iran have experienced different and fluctuated periods. Iranian 
people have traditionally been highly sensitive and suspicious of foreign interference in 
their country, pointing to such events as Russian conquest of northern parts of the 
country, the Tobbaco concession to the British-Soviet occupation during World War I 
and II, and the CIA plot to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. This 
suspicious manifests itself in beliefs many foreigners find highly implausible, such as 
"the fairly common" one that the Iranian Revolution was actually the work of a 
conspiracy between Iran's Shia clergy and the British government.   
 
Relations between Iran and the United States have been disrupted since the revolution in 
Iran. Iran does not maintain official diplomatic relations with either the United States or 
Israel, and it views the Middle East peace process with skepticism. Iran and the United 
States do have diplomatic "Interest Sections" in each other's countries, and that's it. To 
remember why the United States is no favorite in Tehran, one needs to go back at least to 
1953 when the U.S. and Great Britain overthrew Iran's democratically elected Premier 
Mohammad Mossadeq as part of a plan to insure access to Iranian oil. They then 
emplaced the young Shah in power who, with his notorious secret police, proved second 
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to none in cruelty. The Shah ruled from 1953 to 1979. Much resentment can build up 
over a whole generation. His regime fell like a house of cards, when supporters of 
Ayatollah Khomeini rose up to do some regime change of their own.  
 
Iranians also remember Washington's strong support for Saddam Hussein's Iraq after it 
decided to make war on Iran in 1980. U.S. support for Iraq (which included crucial 
intelligence support for the war and an implicit condoning of Saddam's use of chemical 
weapons) was perhaps the crucial factor in staving off an Iranian victory. 
 
 However, finding the real reasons for removing the obstacles and having a good relations 
seems to be very difficult even impossible. So what are the fundamental problems in this 
way? Is there any study or research for answering these questions? The purpose of thesis 
is trying to find out those limitations and analyzing the cost-benefit of existence of the 
relation from different aspects. As a result, the main outcome is giving a macro view to 
policymakers and researchers. 
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CHAPTER 1-THE HISTORY OF IRAN-U.S RELATIONS  
 
A- Early relations 
Political relations between Iran (Persia) and the United States began when the Shah of 
Persia, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Persia's first ambassador, Mirza 
Abolhasan Shirazi, to Washington D.C. in 1856[1]. In 1883, Samuel Benjamin was 
appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran. 
Ambassadorial relations were however established in 1944[2]. 
The first Persian Ambassador to The United States of America was Mirza Albohassan 
Khan Ilchi Kabir. Even before political relations, since the early to mid 1880s, Americans 
had been traveling to Iran. Justin Perkins and Asahel Grant were the first missionaries to 
be dispatched to Persia in 1834 via the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions. The famous vizier of Nasereddin Shah, Amir Kabir, also initiated direct 
contacts with Washington. By the end of the 19th century, negotiations were underway 
for an American company to establish a railway system from the Persian Gulf to Tehran. 
 
Up until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As 
a result many Persian Constitutional Revolution constitutionalist Iranians came to view 
the U.S. as a "third force" in their struggle to break free of the humiliating British and 
Russian meddling and dominance in Persian affairs. It is even believed that such 
appointments were the result of contacts made by the Persian Constitutional 
revolutionaries with the executive branch of the US government, even though no official 
documents of such contacts exist. What is certain however is that Persia's drive for 
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modernizing its economy and liberating it from British and Russian influences had the 
full support of American industrial and business leaders. 
In 1909, during the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Howard Baskerville died in Tabriz 
while trying to help the constitutionalists in a battle against royalist forces. After the 
American financial consultant Morgan Shuster was appointed Treasurer General of Persia 
by the Iranian parliament in 1911, an American was killed in Tehran by henchmen 
thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more 
active in supporting the Constitutional revolution of Persia financially[2, p.83]. When 
Shu'a al-Saltaneh, the Shah's brother who was aligned with the goals of Imperial Russia 
in Persia, was ordered by Iran's government to surrender his assets to it, Shuster was 
assigned this task, which he promptly moved to execute. Imperial Russia immediately 
landed troops in Bandar Anzali demanding a recourse and apology from the Persian 
government. Eventually, Iran's parliament in Tehran was shelled by General Liakhoff of 
Imperial Russia, and Morgan Shuster was forced to resign under tremendous British and 
Russian pressure. Shuster's book The Strangling of Persia is a recount of the details of 
these events, a harsh criticism of Britain and Imperial Russia. 
 
It was the American embassy that first relayed to the Iran desk at the Foreign Office in 
London confirmation of the popular view that the British were involved in the 1921 coup 
that brought Reza Pahlavi to power[4]. A British Embassy report from 1932 admits that 
the British put Reza Shah "on the throne". The United States was not an ally of Britain as 
far as Persia was concerned at that point in time. 
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Morgan Shuster was soon to be followed by Arthur Millspaugh, appointed as Treasurer 
General by Reza Shah Pahlavi, and Arthur Pope, who was a main driving force behind 
the Persian Empire revivalist policies of Reza Shah. But the friendly relations between 
the United States and Iran were about to change at the onset of the 1950s. 
 
B-The 1950s and the politics of oil, a turning point 
From 1952-53, Iran's nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq began a period of 
rapid power consolidation, which led the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to a brief exile 
and then into power again. Much of the events of 1952 were started by Mossadeq’s 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now British Petroleum. Established by 
the British in the early 20th century, an agreement had been made to share profits (85% 
British-15% Iran), but the company withheld their financial records from the Iranian 
government. Due to alleged profit monopolization by the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, the 
Iranian Parliament had unanimously agreed to nationalize its holding of, what was at the 
time, the British Empire’s largest company. 
 
The United States and Britain, through a now-admitted covert operation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) called Operation Ajax, conducted from the US Embassy in 
Tehran, helped organize protests to overthrow Moussadeq and return the Shah to Iran. 
The operation failed and the Shah fled to Italy. After a second successful operation he 
returned from his brief exile. Iran's fledgling attempts at democracy quickly descended 
into dictatorship, as the Shah dismantled the constitutional limitations on his office and 
began to rule as an absolute monarch. 
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During his reign, the Shah received significant American support, frequently making 
state visits to the White House and earning praise from numerous American Presidents. 
The Shah's close ties to Washington and his bold agenda of rapidly Westernizing Iran 
soon began to infuriate certain segments of the Iranian population, especially the hard-
line Islamic conservatives. Because of their eventual ascension to power during the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, Operation Ajax is considered as one of the worst CIA "blowbacks" 
ever. 
 
Relations in the cultural sphere however remained cordial. Pahlavi University (now 
Shiraz University), Sharif University of Technology, and Isfahan University of 
Technology, three of Iran's top academic universities were all directly modeled on 
American institutions such as the University of Chicago, MIT, and the University of 
Pennsylvania[5][6]. The Shah in return was generous in awarding American universities 
with financial gifts. For example, the University of Southern California received a gift 
from the Shah in the form of an endowed chair of petroleum engineering, and a million 
dollar donation was given to the George Washington University to create an Iranian 
Studies program [5]. 
 
C- 1977-1979: Carter administration   
The administration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977 created a strain on relations 
between Iran and the United States. Carter, unlike previous American presidents, was 
outspoken about his criticism of the Shah's government and its human rights record. 
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Carter pressured the Shah to relax freedom of speech and to allow more freedom for 
political dissidents[5]. 
 
Many politicians and political figures in the United States such as Henry Kissinger and 
David Rockefeller vigorously opposed Carter's condemnations of the Imperial Iranian 
government, citing the importance of not weakening the Shah's position in both Iran and 
the region. As is well-known, American administrations previous to Carter had always 
pressured the Shah to remain steadfastly anti-communist and to aggressively prosecute 
Communists and Islamists who were increasingly moving closer together into an anti-
Imperial alliance. 
 
The Carter administration blocked exports of tear gas and rubber bullets to Iran, and was 
also implicated by some commentators in a scandal involving Jimmy Carter demanding 
financial favors from the Shah. Some also attributed these actions against the Shah to 
Carter's attempts to warm up to the Soviet Union[7][8].  
 
D- The 1979 revolution 
In 1979, Iranians revolted and the Shah was ousted for a second time. The American 
administration under President Jimmy Carter refused to give the Shah any further support 
and expressed no interest in attempting to return him to power. A significant 
embarrassment for Carter occurred when the Shah, as of that time suffering from cancer, 
requested entry into the United States for treatment. The American embassy in Tehran 
vigorously opposed the United States granting his request, as they were intent on 
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stabilizing relations between the new interim revolutionary government of Iran and the 
United States [9]. 
 
Despite agreeing with the staff of the American embassy in disallowing the Shah's entry 
into the U.S., after pressure from Kissinger and Rockefeller, among other pro-Shah 
political figures, Carter reluctantly agreed, but the move was used by the Iranian 
revolutionaries' to justify their claims that the former monarch was an American puppet 
and led to the storming of the American embassy by radical students [7]. 
 
E- 1980s: Reagan administration 
The U.S. contends that the organization of Hezbollah has been involved in several anti-
American terrorist attacks, including the April 1983 United States Embassy bombing 
which killed 17 Americans, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing which killed 241 U.S. 
peace keepers in Lebanon, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. A U.S. District court 
judge ruled in 2003 that the April 1983 United States Embassy bombing was by what had 
been at the time been a new organization called Hezbollah supported by the state of Iran 
[2]. In May 2003, in a case brought by the families of the 241 servicemen who were 
killed, U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth declared that the Islamic Republic 
of Iran was responsible for the 1983 attack.  
 
In 1986 members of the Reagan administration helped sell weapons to Iran, using the 
profits to fund Contras militants in Nicaragua. This event led to the Iran-Contra Affair 
which was a political scandal occurring in 1987 as a result of earlier events during the 
Reagan administration in which members of the executive branch sold weapons to Iran, 
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an avowed enemy, and illegally used the profits to continue funding anti-Communist 
rebels, the Contras, in Nicaragua. Large volumes of documents relating to the scandal 
were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials. The 
affair is still shrouded in secrecy. After the arms sales were revealed in November 1986, 
President Ronald Reagan appeared on national television and denied that they had 
occurred. A week later, however, on November 13, Reagan returned to the airwaves to 
affirm that weapons were indeed transferred to Iran. He denied that they were part of an 
exchange for hostages [3]. 
 
On July 3, 1988 towards the end of the Iran Iraq War, the U.S. Navy guided missile 
cruiser USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian Airbus A300B2 on a scheduled commercial 
flight in Iranian airspace over the Strait of Hormuz, killing 290 civilians from six nations, 
including 66 children. USS Vincennes was in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation 
Earnest Will. The United States at first contended that flight 655 was a warplane and then 
said that it was outside the civilian air corridor and did not respond to radio calls. Both 
statements were untrue, and the radio calls were made on military frequencies to which 
the airliner did not have access [10]. On February 22, 1996 the United States paid Iran 
$61.8 million in compensation for the 248 Iranians killed, plus the cost of the aircraft and 
legal expenses [11]. However, the United States has expressed regret only for the loss of 
innocent life, refusing to make a specific apology to the Iranian government [12]. 
 
F- 1990s: Clinton administration 
In April 1995 a total embargo on dealings with Iran by U.S. companies was imposed by 
U.S. president Clinton. Trade with the U.S., which had been growing following the end 
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of the Iran-Iraq war ended abruptly [13]. The next year the American Congress passed 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions act which threatened even non-U.S. countries making large 
investments in energy. The act was denounced by the European Union as null and void, 
but blocked some needed investment for Iran nonetheless. 
 
The election of reformist president Khatami brought hopes for a thawing of relations. In 
January 1998 Khatami called for a "dialog of nations" with US in a CNN interview. US 
Secretary of state Madeleine Albright answered with conciliatory words and there 
followed an exchange of wrestling teams, freer travel to and from the US, and an end to 
the U.S. embargo of two Iranian export items, carpets and pistachios. Relations did not 
improve further though, as Iran's conservatives opposed them in principle and the U.S. 
preconditions for discussions included changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear 
energy, and support for terrorism [14]. 
 
G- 1990s: Bush administration 
Since George W. Bush came to power, the United States has taken several actions against 
Iran. According to Noam Chomsky, the noted polemicist against American imperialism, 
the American government has provided Israel with over a hundred jet bombers, openly 
advertised as capable of bombing Iran and returning, capturing Iranian officials in Iraq, 
deploying major naval forces in the Persian Gulf, supporting Pakistan-based insurgent 
groups to attack Iran, supporting Azeri separatists were among actions carried out by the 
United States against Iran. Chomsky claims: "These are major violation of United 
Nation’s charter" [15]. 
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In 2003 Before invading Iraq, the Bush administration rebuffed a series of overtures from 
Iran's reformist government -- among them offers to help the U.S. stabilize Iraq after the 
invasion -- with the help of the American Iranian Council, Iran made a secret proposal for 
a "grand bargain". This "grand bargain" would resolve all outstanding issues between the 
U.S. and Iran, including Iran's alleged support for terrorism and its nuclear program. The 
U.S., which had branded Iran part of the "axis of evil," decided on a confrontational 
approach. It is unknown if or how much of the present chaos could have been averted had 
the Administration taken up this "Grand Bargain." (see PBS Frontline Documentary 
showing on October 23, 2007). 
On January 29, 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush gave his "Axis of evil" speech, 
describing Iran, along with North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, as an axis of evil 
and warning that the proliferation of long-range missiles developed by these countries 
was of great danger to the US and that it constituted terrorism. The speech caused outrage 
in Iran and was condemned by reformists and conservatives alike [16]. 
Since 2003 the U.S. has been flying unmanned aerial vehicles, launched from Iraq, over 
Iran to obtain intelligence on Iran's nuclear program, reportedly providing little new 
information. The Iranian government has formally protested the incursions as illegal [17]. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES  
 
A-Introduction 
The Iranian Revolution, also known as the Islamic Revolution, was the revolution that 
transformed Iran from a monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to an Islamic 
republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution and founder of 
the Islamic Republic. Although some might argue that the revolution is still ongoing, its 
time span can be said to have begun in January 1978 with the first major demonstrations 
to overthrow the Shah, and concluded with the approval of the new theocratic 
Constitution — whereby Ayatollah Khomeini became Supreme Leader of the country — 
in December 1979. Iran officially became an Islamic Republic on April 1, 1979 when 
Iranians overwhelmingly approved a national referendum to make it so [1]. 
The Islamic Revolution in 1979, has been considered as a turning point in Iran-West 
relations. The US has played a central role in shaping the West orientation toward 
Tehran. Iran with it’s oil and gas resources, its geopolitical location and its special place 
in the region and the Islamic world has been viewed as an important regional and 
international player. Meanwhile Iran’s domestic process is a vital and integrated part of 
social and political change in the Middle East, the Islamic world and developing 
countries. Iran is located at the center of the world’s largest pool of energy; it straddles 
prominently the global oil and natural gas checkpoints at the Strait of Hormuz. It 
provides the cheapest and the shortest transit route at the heart of the ancient Silk Road 
for the transport of energy resources from the Caspian Sea basin to the world markets 
through the Persian Gulf; and it is the most populated country with one of the largest 
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industrial bases in the vast region stretching from the Caspian Sea to Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
After the revolution Iran- US, relations and confrontations underlined Iran and the West 
relations. The US policy-makers wanted to maintain relations with Iran , because of their 
economic, political and military interests, but after the Shah’s fall, US relations with Iran 
were never normalized, and on the contrary changed to increased anti-Americanism[2]. 
 
B- From Iran Perspective 
1.Historical reasons: Avoiding Foreigners interference and keeping I independency 
Iran is a country with a rich culture, historical record and a stable government. These 
elements will respectively lead to national identity, social stability and a well placed 
political culture. A vast land area, rich resources and strategic location impart to Iran a 
special standing in political calculations and greater scope to attain a genuine position as 
a regional power as compared with other countries, like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Iran’s 
geo-politic, which links Asia to the Middle- East, Central Asia to the Persian Gulf and 
serves, as a connecting point of four sub-regions, is a strong point that cannot be denied 
by any regional and global power. This situation has long invited the interference and 
competition of foreigners seeking to put government they desire in power. It means that 
Iran should manage seriously its strategic location; otherwise, the significant geographic 
size of Iran turns to a weak point rather than a strong one. 
By studying Iran’s history over the last two centuries, we can see how Iranians have 
usually felt deeply affiliated to their national, social, ethnic and religious heritage. Iran’s 
political and social movements in its contemporary history have been concentrated on 
keeping national sovereignty and independency. Therefore, on one hand Iran’s 
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geopolitical and geo-economic position move it toward the great powers, but on the other 
hand, the Iranian orientation is to avoid their influence. 
The US never recognize the failures of its past policies in Iran, which can partially be 
interpreted as the roots of anti-American feeling in Iran, such as the 1953 CIA engineered 
coup against prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq and its long support for the unpopular 
regime of the Shah[3]. The US after the revolution adopted the same policies, leading to 
more extremism in Iran. The Carter administration relied only on the moderates in the 
Bazargan government, isolating itself from the revolution by ignoring its main leader. 
Meanwhile there were some events, which could be interpreted as clear US hostility toward 
Iran, such as non-recognition of the new regime, the Elghanian case, CIA intervention in 
Iranian internal affairs, and finally the admission of Mohammad Reza Shah to the US. All of 
these together with the policy failures mentioned before led the revolutionaries to react, most 
notably by the embassy takeover. With the US and Western condemnation and blockade 
against Iran, the revolution remained in political international isolation, contributing 
effectively to the outbreak of Iraqi invasion in 1980[4]. With Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, 
because of revolutionary Iran, the US and Iraq avoided their real differences and began to 
have better relations. US policymakers adopted a dual policy toward the Iran-Iraq War, 
firstly, concealing satisfaction with the Iraqi invasion; because of many opportunities that the 
invasion created for the Carter administration, secondly, maintaining Iran’s strategic position 
and integrity in the region as a buffer to the Soviet Union, as the Islamic government in 
Tehran while anti-American was also anti-Soviet[5]. Because of the hostage crisis in Tehran 
and the US-Iran failure to construct diplomatic relations, the US and many Western countries 
never condemned Iraq’s clear invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980. With such a policy, 
the west discounted the aggressive nature of the Ba’th government in Baghdad and 
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consequently opened the way for Saddam’s increased ambition in the region and in the Arab 
world, as a whole in the future.  
 
2. Econoic Sanctions 
During 1990s until now, the US has continued hard-line policies regarding Iran, making the 
improvement in US- Iran’s bilateral relation far more difficult. The first US sanctions against 
Iran formalized in November of 1979, and during the hostage crisis, many sanctions leveled 
against the Iranian government. By 1987, the import of Iranian goods into the United States 
had banned. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, banning US 
investment in Iran’s energy sector, followed a few weeks later by Executive Order 12957 of 
May 6, 2000, eliminating all trade and investment and virtually all interaction between the 
United States an Iran[6]. The US links an end to its unilateral sanctions to Iran’s compliance 
with a number of demands, including: ending support for radical organizations such as 
Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas; ceasing active opposition 
to an Israeli- Palestinian peace process; and suspending its alleged WMD programs. 
From Iran’s perspective, dialogue should emphasize, an end to Washington’s efforts to 
overthrow the regime in Tehran, as exemplified by the $ 20 million given to the CIA for that 
end, an end to support for anti-regime activities abroad, an end to hostile propaganda over the 
airwaves against Iran, particularly as perceived to encourage the secession of Iranian 
Azerbaijan. Tehran, wants the American to abandon their sanctions and drop objection to the 
transfer to Iran of advanced technology “for peaceful nuclear purposes”. It also wants to 
resolve outstanding financial claims, as well as be included in regional oil and gas projects 
involving the other Caspian Sea riparian states [7]. 
On the other hand, US relations with European allies are significantly strained by US 
unilateral sanctions against Europeans firms that do business with Iran. Some Europeans 
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have refused to comply and are considering retaliatory measures against the US. 
European states, moreover, do not share US analysis of the nature of the Iranian problem 
and do not support most US tactical measures to deal with Iran. Meanwhile US economic 
sanctions upon Iran are costly to American firms; US policies tend to push Iran into much 
closer relations with Russia. However, normal commercial energy planning in the region 
cannot take place while Iran is excluded [8]. 
By blocking Iranian transit routes, the United States encourages alternative routes 
through Russia, giving Russia leverage over this flow-much to the dismay of the newly 
independent Caspian states. Thus, while Iran remains the preferred pipeline transit option 
for most oil companies in developing Caspian energy, some of them feel they must 
exclude that option. Consequently, US political hostility to Iran impedes development of 
the vast East-West transport corridors along the new Silk Route, affecting the interests of 
Turkey, Armenia , Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and China. 
The United States, pushing for international sanctions against Tehran over its atomic 
ambitions, accuses Iran of providing logistical and financial support to Shi'a militias in 
Iraq, something Tehran denies [9]. The U.S. government imposed sanctions on an Iranian 
bank on September 8, 2006, barring it from dealing with U.S. financial institutions, even 
indirectly. The move against Bank Saderat Iran was announced by the undersecretary for 
treasury, who accused the major state-owned bank in Iran of transferring funds for 
alleged terrorist groups, including Hezbollah. While Iranian financial institutions are 
barred from directly accessing the U.S. financial system, they are permitted to do so 
indirectly through banks in other countries. This move was explicitly aimed at Bank 
Saderat, which the undersecretary said had transferred 50 million U.S. dollars directly 
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from Iran to a Hezbollah-controlled organization, and does not apply to other Iranian 
banks. He said the U.S. government would also persuade European banks and financial 
institutions not to deal with Iran [10]. In the next chapter, we will explain more on 
economic sanctions.   
 
3. U.S. Support of anti-Iranian groups  
Scott Ritter has stated that CIA-backed bombings had been undertaken in Iran by the 
Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK or MKO), an opposition group listed by the United States 
Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization [11].  In April 2006, The Raw 
Story cited an unnamed UN source "close to" the United Nations Security Council stating 
that former MEK members had been used as a proxy by the US for "roughly a year" 
inside of Iranian territory. An intelligence source quoted by The Raw Story said that the 
former MEK members were made to "swear an oath to Democracy and resign from the 
MEK" before being incorporated into US military units and retrained for their operations 
in Iran [12]. 
Following the killing of 24 Iranian security forces in Iran in March 2006 by the Party for 
a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK), an opposition group closely linked to the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK), which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, Dennis Kucinich claimed in a letter to George W. Bush on April 18, 2006, 
that PEJAK is being supported and coordinated by the US, since it is based in Iraq, which 
is under the de facto control of US military forces [13]. In November 2006, journalist 
Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker supported this claim, stating that the US military and 
the Israelis are giving the group equipment, training, and targeting information in order to 
create internal pressures in Iran [14]. Stratfor (as cited by Media Lens) claimed that an 
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attack inside Iran against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps occurred in early 2007: 
"this latest attack against IRGC guards was likely carried out by armed Baloch 
nationalists who have received a boost in support from Western intelligence agencies" 
[15]. On April 3, 2007, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) published a claim 
that Jundullah, a militant Islamic organization that is based in Waziristan, Pakistan and 
affiliated with Al-Qaeda and has claimed to kill about 400 Iranian soldiers while losing 
an indeterminable amount of terrorists,[16] has been supported by the USA since 2005 
[17]. 
 
C- US Claims 
 
"According to the Administration, Iran is a major national security challenge for the 
United States. The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran’s nuclear 
program but is compounded by Iran’s military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. 
However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the 
December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that 
indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush 
Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing 
the potential threat posed by Iran – strengthening international economic and political 
isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it end its 
enrichment of uranium. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran’s nuclear and related 
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entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require 
reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to suspend 
enrichment, a modest further tightening of sanctions has been agreed to by the permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany. Separate U.S. efforts, showing 
some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, 
investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. 
However, a December 2007 GAO report on U.S. sanctions says the impact on Iran’s 
economy is difficult to determine" [18]. 
 
1. Supporting of international terrorism 
"State Sponsors of Terrorism" is a designation applied by the United States Department 
of State to nations who are designated by the Secretary of State "to have repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism." [19] Inclusion on the list imposes 
strict sanctions. The list began on December 29, 1979 with Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, 
and Syria. According to Country Reports on Terrorism: April 30, 2007 [20], The US 
states that Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Its Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) were directly 
involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of 
groups, especially Palestinian groups with leadership cadres in Syria and Lebanese 
Hizballah, to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.  
Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, 
rhetorically, operationally, and financially. Supreme Leader Khamenei and President 
Ahmadi-Nejad praised Palestinian terrorist operations, and Iran provided Lebanese 
Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups - notably HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
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the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command - with extensive funding, training, and weapons.  
Iran continued to play a destabilizing role in Iraq, which appeared to be inconsistent with 
its stated objectives regarding stability in Iraq. Iran provided guidance and training to 
select Iraqi Shia political groups, and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to 
enable anti-Coalition attacks. Iranian government forces have been responsible for at 
least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants 
with the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles similar to those 
developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was linked 
to armor-piercing explosives that resulted in the deaths of Coalition Forces. The 
Revolutionary Guard, along with Lebanese Hizballah, implemented training programs for 
Iraqi militants in the construction and use of sophisticated IED technology. These 
individuals then passed on this training to additional militants in Iraq.  
Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior AQ members it detained in 2003, and it 
has refused to publicly identify these senior members in its custody. Iran has repeatedly 
resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of its AQ detainees to their countries of origin 
or third countries for interrogation or trial. Iran also continued to fail to control the 
activities of some al-Qaida members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. 
 
2.  Opponent with Israel 
Relations between Iran and Israel have alternated from close political alliances between 
the two states during the era of the Pahlavi dynasty to hostility following the rise to 
power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Currently, the countries do not have diplomatic 
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relations with each other. Iran does not formally recognize Israel as a country, and 
official government texts often simply refer to it as the "Zionist entity " or the "Zionist 
regime."  Iran was the second country (after the United States) to formally recognise the 
establishment of the State of Israel. The history of the Persian Jews has been 
uninterrupted for over 2,500 years. It is a Mizrahi Jewish community in the territory of 
today's Iran, the historical core of the former Persian Empire, which began as early as the 
8th century BCE, at the time of captivity of the ancient Israelites in Khorasan. 
As of 2005, Iran has the largest Jewish population in the Middle East outside of Israel; 
the Iranian Jewish community is guaranteed one seat in the Majlis, currently held by 
Maurice Motamed. A larger population of Iranian Jews reside in Israel with the former 
President of Israel Moshe Katsav, former Chief of Staff and Defense Minister Shaul 
Mofaz, former Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Israeli hip-hop star Subliminal being the 
most famous of this group. 
After revolution, It was Ayatollah Khomeini who first declared Israel as an "enemy of 
Islam" and 'The Little Satan' during the second Pahlavi period in his campaign against 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who supported Israel (the United States was called 'The 
Great Satan'). Ayatollah Khomeini also called for Israel's destruction [21]. After the 
second phase of the 1979 Iranian Revolution which witnessed the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic, Iran withdrew its recognition of the state of Israel and cut off all 
official relations; official statements, state institutes, events and sanctioned initiatives 
adopted a sharp anti-Zionist and arguably antisemitic stance, such as the 2005 "World 
Without Zionism" conference in Teheran[22]. Iranian military parades started featuring 
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ballistic missiles adorned with slogans such as 'Israel must be uprooted and erased from 
history' [23].  
 
3. Nuclear Program 
 The US stress that Iran has an inferiority complex, wants nuclear weapons for 
psychological comfort and to ensure the Islamic Republic’s survival, and therefore would 
base its nuclear strategy on defensive deterrence. The US believes that Iran needs 
advanced nuclear technology for numerous reasons: weapons of mass destruction were 
used by Iraq against Iran in their 8-year long war; Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United 
States have them; Iran is strategically isolated and needs self- sufficiency to defend itself 
in the event of attack, and the possession of such weapons would give the regime 
legitimacy, respectability, and protection. All these reasons give the regime a substantial 
interest in pursuing the nuclear option [24]. 
The US claims that a nuclear armed Iran and dominated by ‘conservative clerics’ and 
politicians following a hard line on foreign policy and security issues might become less 
risk- averse and act more aggressively toward its neighbors and foes. It might demand 
that its Muslim and Arab neighbors adopt its political and security visions. It might 
shelter its extremist surrogate and groups using terror tactics under its nuclear umbrella 
and encourage them to try to destabilize Israel, spoil peace talks, make influence on Iraq, 
cripple down anti- Syrian efforts in Lebanon or shape the oil market. It would be difficult 
for the US, the EU, Russia, China, or other Asian governments, with their heavy 
dependence on the Persian Gulf energy resources, to ignore Iran in a spoiler mode. 
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In summary, obstacles to "resumption of relations" between the two countries from the 
U.S. perspective can be noted as follow:  
• State sponsorship of international terrorism 
• Pursuit of weapons of mass destruction  
• Threats to neighbors in the Persian Gulf, 
• Opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process  
• Violations of human rights 
In recent years, the last two issues seem to have lost some of their potency and are now 
only infrequently raised. On the other hand, a new accusation of Iran's harboring of al 
Qaeda operatives has recently been added to the list. 
On Iran's side, its original post-revolutionary list of demands included: 
• That the United States accept the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution,  
• Not interfere in Iran's internal affairs,  
• Deal with the Iranian regime on the basis of "respect and equality." 
 
Subsequent demands by Iran are as follow: 
• Lifting U.S. economic sanctions,  
• Release of frozen Iranian assets in the United States  
• Removal of the U.S. Navy from the Persian Gulf  
• An end to one-sided support for Israel 
• A formal apology for Washington's past misdeeds 
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D- Conclusion 
From the Iranian point of view, US policies unfairly hinder the development of an Iranian 
economy already hurt severely by the punishing eight-year Iran – Iraq war. Iran’s ability to 
develop and modernize its own energy sector has been sharply handicapped, even though 
Iran remains the second largest oil producer in the Persian Gulf today, still being isolated 
from much of the rest of the world, partly because of US pressure. As Iran lives in a 
dangerous and unpredictable neighborhood, its officials are careful to reassure their 
immediate neighbors that Iran poses no threat to regional stability and would never use its 
special capabilities to intimidate or influence them. It seems that Iranian believe that the 
only way they can maintain their territorial integrity, restore their prestige, and preserve 
their political survival is through reliance on its nuclear capabilities and its ability to be 
totally self- sufficient in nuclear research and production. Officials in Tehran in many 
occasions stressed that Iran never wants nuclear weapons because it has been a victim of 
mass destruction. 
 
Iranians, they emphasize, know that the use of nuclear weapons against Israeli or US 
targets would be suicidal. They also point out that such use would be historically 
uncharacteristic; after all, Iran has not invaded or attacked another country over 150 
years. These observers predict that a nuclear-armed Iran would not be aggressive and 
would have better relations with the US. With Iran’s standing in the Islamic world, The 
US and Israel would be held responsible for any preemptive attack, regardless of 
deniability. This only would increase the risk of violent retaliations. Iranian friends, such 
as Hezbollah in Lebanon and some Palestinian factions could retaliate, and some other 
organizations such as al-Qaeda would certainly use this evidence of Christian- Zionist 
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collusion against Muslims to win more recruits, rally anti-American demonstration, and 
encourage violent operations. Meanwhile, the balance of power within the Iranian regime 
would shift further to the right. The hardliners would claim vindication for their anti- 
American views, and their role as the Ultimate guarantors of Iranian national security 
would be confirmed. So, the role of civil security and related groups would be 
downgraded. 
 
Iran’s geopolitical relations with regional and global powers make it an important player 
with international standing. It seems Iran’s national security less connects to regional 
relations, and more depends to forming relations with the great powers. For Iran, 
providing national security, avoiding security threats and keeping national identity and 
political system could not be achieved without working relations with the great powers. 
Establishing constructive relations with the influential Western powers can be seen as the 
most important task in its foreign policy, because of too many problems and challenges, 
which are arising from disorder in its relations with the Western countries. 
Hostility in both countries, Iran and the US has become somewhat institutionalized, 
complicating a rapprochement. In the United States, growing recognition that US policies 
toward Iran have not been successful and indeed are increasingly costly helps create an 
openness to change. Meanwhile, economic development is urgently required in Iran to 
support the necessary and difficult process of political change. 
As many argue, sanctions, particularly unilateral sanctions such as those targeted at Iran, 
are less and less effective in a global economy, where governments have the opportunity 
to produce their strategic needs from other countries. Instead, sanctions are likely to 
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impose further hardship on the poor, while seldom adversely affecting the regime and 
government officials. If the intent of the sanctions was to limit the Iranian government’s 
military or nuclear procurements, or limit investment in oil and gas exploration, the 
sanctions have been a total failure. European companies have taken the lead in investing 
in Iranian oil and gas fields in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s cooperation with Russia, Pakistan 
and other countries on procuring equipment for its nuclear power plants have also not 
been affected by the sanctions. 
However, if the objective of the sanctions was to punish the Iranian people, sanctions can 
be deemed quite effective. Iranian state-owned airlines are flying dilapidated planes that 
put passengers at risk, and the consumers purchase US products at double or triple their 
original price. Many advocates the US sanctions against Iran have argued that sanctions 
can serve to increase dissatisfaction with the Iranian government and increase the 
likelihood of an internal regime change. But we can say that did not work in the case of 
Iraq, where far harsher, multilateral sanctions were in effect, and it is far less likely to 
happen in Iran. In fact, at any time the Iranian government has felt less isolated, it has 
been more responsive to the international community. The fact that European pressure on 
Iran are far more effective than pressure applied by the US may be explained by the large 
investment of European firms in the Iranian oil and gas industries, as well as extensive 
trade. So it seems that a historic move towards opening up trade and strengthening the 
Iranian private sector and civil society could prove more fruitful than isolationist policies 
of the past years, which have not had any significant effect on social and political 
changes in Iran. 
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Iran’s policy makers have failed until now to recognize international conditions and the 
country’s place in the hierarchy of world power. The regional power of Iran will be 
retained if it can solve its problems at the national level and has a stable position as a 
government and nation. Domestic political stability is a pre-condition for consensus 
making in the area of foreign policy. Iran’s government should plan to promote human 
right programs, and public living standards with better situation in domestic policy Iran 
would be able to bargain strongly in international arena. 
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CHAPTER 3- ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
A- Introduction 
Economic sanctions are domestic penalties applied by one country (or group of countries) 
on another for a variety of reasons. Economic sanctions include, but are not limited to, 
tariffs, trade barriers, import duties, and import or export quotas. Economic sanctions are 
frequently retaliatory in nature. Economic sanctions are not always imposed because of 
economic circumstances. For example, on May 13th 1998, the United States and Japan 
imposed economic sanctions on India, following its second round of nuclear tests. The 
United States has imposed economic sanctions on Iran for years, stating Iran's "state 
sponsor of terrorism" as its main reason. 
Generally, economic sanctions might be defined as "coercive economic measures taken 
against one or more countries to force a change in policies or at least to demonstrate a 
country's opinion about the other's policies'' [1]. The most-often quoted study on 
sanctions defines the term as "...the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat 
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations" [2]. Economic sanctions 
typically include measures such as trade embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or 
imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments; or control of foreign assets 
and economic transactions that involve U. S. citizens or businesses. These definitions of 
economic sanctions would exclude diplomatic demarches, reductions in embassy staff or 
closing of embassies, mobilizing armed forces or going to war--tools clearly intended to 
change another country's behavior through other than economic means. The use of 
"carrots" (e.g., granting most-favored-nation status for another year; or selling advanced 
military aircraft to Taiwan to change China's behavior) would not qualify as a sanction. 
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B- The History of US Sanctions against Iran: Chronology of Key Events, 1984-2006 
By some estimates, the U.S. currently has imposed some form of economic sanctions on 
over seventy countries (USA Engage, 2001). There are a number of possible reasons why 
the U.S. is by far the pre-eminent sender of sanctions. First, as a superpower, the U.S. has 
influence and thus tries to get countries and entities around the globe to support, or at 
least not frustrate, its political, economic, and military agendas. Second, the U.S. 
economy is so big--representing roughly twenty-five to thirty percent of global GDP--that 
U.S. economic sanctions could have an impact on a target since it could represent a 
significant market for a country's exports, be the supplier of choice for a country's 
imports, be a major source of capital flows to support a country's investment program, 
and so on. Third, the U.S. can further affect the target by asserting pressures to support 
U.S. policies regarding the target on third countries and on international and regional 
organizations. Fourth, U.S. politicians are vulnerable to domestic lobbying from special 
interest groups (for example, financial donors to campaigns and representatives of a large 
voting bloc) who have economic or political interests in sanctioning a country (for 
example, the Cuban and steel lobbies). Fifth, while the U.S. could resort to force in 
pursuing economic and political ends, it is politically preferable for politicians to use 
sanctions, inasmuch as military engagement requires funding, results in U.S. casualties, 
and can escalate. 
U.S. sanctions on Iran have gone through a number of changes over the last twenty years. 
They were imposed to change various policies, including opposition to the Middle East 
peace process, support for Hezballah and Hamas, acquisition of nuclear and ballistic 
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weapons, general support for international terrorism, and hostility toward the U.S. The 
fallowing contains a list and a brief description of the most prominent sanctions affecting 
U.S.-Iranian economic relations: 
23 January 1984: Alleging Iranian involvement in Marine base bombing in Lebanon, US 
State Department adds Iran to list of nations supporting terrorism, and thus subject to 
stringent export controls. 
26 October 1987: President Reagan invokes section 505 of the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and embargoes all imports from Iran, prohibits 
export of 14 types of potentially militarily useful goods, including inboard and outboard 
motors, mobile communications equipment, electrical generators, hydrofoil vessels. 
15 March 1995: President Clinton issues executive order barring US citizens and 
companies from financing, supervising and managing oil development projects in Iran—
blocking Conoco’s pending $1 billion investment in Iranian offshore oil project. 
30 April 1995: Citing proliferation and terrorist concerns, the White House announces it 
will ban effective 8 June 1995, all direct US trade with Iran, as well as an estimated $4 
billion in indirect trade, mainly by American companies selling Iranian oil in third 
countries. French, German and British officials call sanctions the wrong approach and 
announce they will continue their policy of “critical dialogue” with the Iranian regime. 
Oil analysts estimate that Iran will have no trouble finding buyers for its exports to 
replace American companies. 
7 March 1996: US and Israeli intelligence sources allege Iranian involvement in a recent 
wave of terrorist attacks in Israel. 
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2 May 1996: US military officials charge Iran has acquired Nodong II missiles from North 
Korea and is building underground bunkers to deploy them. 
23 July 1996: The House passes Senate version of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA), which penalizes companies investing over $40 million in one year in Iran’s oil 
and gas sector; after one year, the annual investment limit triggering sanctions drops to 
$20 million. Potential sanctions include two or more of the following: (1) denial of 
credits from the US Export-Import Bank; (2) denial of export licenses for controlled 
goods or technology; (3) prohibition of loans of more than $10 million from US financial 
institutions for a 12-month period; (4) prohibition of foreign financial institutions from 
dealing in US government debt or US government funds; (5) prohibition against 
participation in any US government procurement project; (6) import restrictions. 
Sanctions are required to be in effect for up to two years, and in “no case” can they be 
applied for less than one year. The President may waive all or part of the sanctions 
against a foreign company if doing so is deemed to be in the national interest. Bill sunsets 
five years after enactment unless Congress votes to extend. 
19 August 1997: President Clinton issues an executive order that explicitly prohibits re-
exports of US goods, technology and services to Iran. 
21 February 1998: Despite US objections, Russia decides to expand role in building nuclear 
power plant in Iran. 
22 July 1998: Iran tests a missile with an 800-mile range, capable of reaching Israel. 
American officials say the “Shahab 3” missile came from North Korea. 
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25 November 1998: Russia signs an $800 million deal to finish building the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant in Iran; announces it may bid on three more nuclear reactors for $3 billion. 
Russia assures US that agreement concerns peaceful nuclear cooperation only. 
23 February 1999: US impose import sanctions on 10 Russian entities for giving assistance 
to Iranian nuclear and missile programs. 
28 April 1999: President Clinton announces that the US will exempt exports of food and 
medicine from future sanctions imposed by the executive branch. The new rules also 
apply to food and medicine sales to Iran, Libya, and Sudan, which will be permitted on a 
case-by-case basis. Specific licensing rules will be drawn up for each country and there 
will be no US government, funding, financing or guarantees for the sales. Early Dec. 
1999 US officials say that intelligence reports suggest that Iran has recently increased aid 
to terrorist groups opposing the Middle East peace process. 
15 March 2000: President Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 into law. Act 
requires the president to send report to Congress identifying countries and entities 
assisting Iran with its weapons programs and gives the president the authority to impose 
sanctions on these countries but does not make sanctions mandatory. The Act also bars 
the US from making “extraordinary” payments to the Russian Space Agency to build the 
International Space Station or any other organization of the Russian government until the 
president determines that Russia is actively opposing proliferation in Iran. The president 
may waive sanctions for national security reasons. 
17 March 2000: Secretary of State Albright announces that US will lift ban on Iranian non-
oil exports such as carpets, caviar, pistachios and dried fruit, and states that US will 
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increase efforts to reach a settlement to all legal and financial claims between the two 
countries and to reduce barrier to cultural exchanges. US sanctions barring 
American investment in Iran’s oil sector, however, remains in place. 
14 April 2000: US government determines that five entities in North Korea and Iran have 
engaged in missile technology proliferation activities that require imposition of sanctions 
under the Arms Export Control Act. Sanctions are largely symbolic. 
27 July 2001: Congress renews ILSA for another five years, despite opposition from the 
US business community and the Bush administration. The “ILSA Extension Act of 2001” 
requires the president to submit a report to Congress within 24 to 30 months on the 
effectiveness of the sanctions, their impact on other US economic and foreign policy 
interests and the humanitarian situation in Iran and Libya. European Commission 
criticizes the ILSA extension and threatens to retaliate if sanctions are imposed against 
European companies. 
13 February 2002: US blocks Iran’s bid to join the WTO. 
25 July 2002: Under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act of 1992, the US sanctions 
nine Chinese companies and one Indian entity for selling prohibited goods to Iran. 
21 October 2002: Russian officials refuse an American proposal to lift restrictions on the 
import of spent nuclear fuel into Russia (which can be reprocessed to make enriched 
uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons) in return for Russia’s ceasing all atomic 
cooperation with Tehran, including the construction of the Bushehr reactor. 
21–22 February 2003: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visits Iran to make 
nuclear inspections and urge Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards 
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Agreement, which would require an increase in the transparency of the Iranian nuclear 
program and provide the IAEA with increased access. 
May 2003: Responding to US pressure, Russia informs Iran that it will not deliver the 
nuclear fuel for Bushehr unless Iran signs the Additional Protocol. 
4 June 2003: Russia changes course from its May 2003 announcement, now declaring it 
will not link the supply of nuclear fuel in Bushehr to Iran’s signing of the Additional 
Protocol. 
6 June 2003: IAEA report to its Board of Governors concludes that Iran has failed to meet 
its “safeguards” obligations by failing to fully account for nuclear material imported from 
China in 1991. 
10 November 2003: IAEA report to its Board of Governors condemns Iran for 18 years of 
manufacturing enriched uranium and plutonium as part of a secret nuclear program. 
18 December 2003: Iran signs the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
13 March 2004: IAEA Board of Governors unanimously rebukes Iran for failing to disclose 
significant aspects of its nuclear program. In February 2004, US investigations into the 
nuclear network masterminded by AQ Khan of Pakistan (the father of Pakistan’s nuclear 
bomb) uncover Iran’s plans to build advanced P2 reactors for enriching uranium. 
Retaliating against the IAEA rebuke, Iran immediately bars nuclear inspectors from 
entering the country. 
28 October 2004: Iran and China sign a preliminary agreement to allow China’s Sinopec 
Group to develop Iran’s Yadavaran oil field in exchange for agreeing to buy 10 million 
tons of Iranian liquefied natural gas annually for 25 years. 
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26 May 2005: Prompted in part by Iran’s recent nuclear cooperation in negotiations with 
the EU, the US announces it will allow Iran’s WTO membership talks to begin. 
4 February 2006: IAEA governing board refers Iran to the UN Security Council over 
concerns that the country is developing nuclear weapons. 
14 February 2006: Iran resumes uranium enrichment. Earlier, Iran announced it would no 
longer permit surprise inspections of nuclear facilities [3]. 
 
C- Economic Sanctions Issues 
Besides the initial freezing of Iranian assets, the most prominent sanctions on Iran are the 
restrictions on U.S.-Iranian trade (all imports from Iran and all exports to Iran in 1995) 
and the prohibition of investments in Iran (in 1995 and extended to third countries in 
1996 via USA. As noted above, while the impact of trade restrictions has been the most 
visible, noticed, studied, and debated aspect of U.S. sanctions, the less discussed non-
trade and indirect sanction policies may have had a more significant and longer-term 
impact (Preeg, 1999). These non-trade sanctions, policies, and effects include restricting 
the availability of export financing from the U.S., restricting the availability of export 
financing from third countries, restricting the availability of IMF/World Bank financing, 
increasing the cost and restricting the availability of commercial financing, restricting 
Iran's debt-rescheduling efforts, impairing FDI flows (especially in the energy sector), 
U.S. opposition to gas and oil pipelines across Iran, and opposition to oil-swaps with Iran. 
According to a brilliant study, U.S. sanctions could have increased Iran's cost of capital 
for a number of reasons. First, the withdrawal of U.S. commercial banks from lending to 
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Iran would mean less competition to supply Iran with capital and thus a somewhat higher 
cost. Second, a negative economic perception of Iran (higher risk) imparted by U.S. 
sanctions could affect third countries' assessment of Iranian investment risk, again 
increasing Iran's cost of borrowing. Third, the cloud of a secondary U.S. boycott of third 
countries' transactions with Iran could deter their lending to Iran and thus further increase 
its borrowing costs. 
There has been no U.S. export financing available for Iran from the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank since 1990. The unavailability of such financing was clearly in force prior to 
executive order #12959 in 1995. The absence of U.S. export financing has had several 
costs for Iran. First, Iran has incurred the differential cost between commercial trade 
financing and that afforded by U.S. government-supported export financing programs. 
Second, the absence of U.S. trade financing may have resulted in lower trade financing 
for Iran from other countries, because countries provide export financing in order to 
compete with other countries. If the U.S. is not providing export financing for Iran, then 
there is less pressure for other countries to do so to compete with U.S. exporters. 
Moreover, U.S. sanctions may increase the perceived risk of Iranian financing and thus 
lower the availability (or increase the cost) of export financing from other countries [4]. 
By doing a comprehensive economic sanction on Iran, the countries that are considered 
Iran's major trade partners will be forced to end or severely reduce their trade relations 
with that country. Doing so will impose a cost on their expert industries. For the past two 
decades the United States has imposed a partial but broad economic sanction on Iran and 
as a result the volume of trade between the two countries is minimal. Advanced European 
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and Asian countries, on the other hand, have maintained close economic ties with Islamic 
Republic of Iran in this period and will have to give up their current share of Iran import 
market. Furthermore, the recent rise in Iran's oil revenues has allowed it to increase its 
merchandise imports in the past five years. Total volume of imports rose by 189% from 
$13.7 billion in 2000 to an estimated $39.7 billion in 2005.  
In 2005 Germany had the largest share of Iran's export market with $5.67 billion (14.4%). 
Germany has indeed been Iran's top trade partner in the past 15 years but its share 
diminished from 17.8% of Iran's total imports in 1990 to 10.5% in 2000 before rising 
again in recent years. The second rank among top exporters to Iran in 2005 belongs to 
China with $3.3 billion or (8.3% of total). China's exports to Iran have enjoyed the fastest 
growth rate in the past five years. Iran's imports from China rose by 360% between 2000 
and 2005. The rise of China has been associated with a decline in Japan's exports to Iran. 
In 1990 Japan was the second largest exporter to Iran with 11.2% of total market but this 
share has declined to 3.37% in 2005. Aside from China's inexpensive products, Iran is 
also buying more from China for strategic reasons. China is a member of the U.N 
Security Council and has repeatedly resisted the United States' calls for diplomatic and 
economic isolation of Iran.   
Italy and France are also among major exporters to Iran. Italy was the third largest 
exporter to Iran in 2005 with 7.5% of the market and France ranked sixth with 6.2%. 
Unlike continental Europe, the United Kingdom has lost a portion of its share of Iran 
market in recent years. While it ranked 4th among top exporters to Iran in 1995 with 5% 
of the market, it could not make it to top ten in 2005. This is partly due to the rising 
diplomatic tensions between the two countries. Iran has accused the U.K. of supporting 
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the separatist militants that have been responsible for several bombings in the oil rich 
south-eastern province of Khuzestan. The U.K, on the other hand, has accused Iran of 
supporting the Shiite militias that have attacked its troops in Southern Iraq.  
Iran has used its international trade relations for diplomatic goals in the past and it is 
likely to continue this policy in the coming years as the current nuclear crisis continues.  
In 2005, Iran put severe restrictions on Korean exports after that country sided with the 
United States in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ruling against Iran. A 
similar implicit boycott was also imposed on exports of the United Kingdom.  In the next 
two years Iran's trade with the European Union (EU) will be highly vulnerable to 
diplomatic developments. The share of EU in Iran import market has increased from 36% 
in 2000 to 41.7% in 2005 and the Iranian government had hoped that this steady growth 
will discourage EU from supporting an economic sanction against Iran. At the same time 
the growing share of Europe in Iran's merchandise imports has increased Iran's 
dependency on European industrial products and machinery.  Iran's manufacturing and 
industrial sector will experience a severe short-term recession if the supply of European 
exports are cut off. In the longer run Iran can find Chinese substitutes for most of these 
European products as long as China does not join the economic sanction against Iran.    
*Top ten exporters to Iran in 2005:  Germany (14.2%), China (8.3%), Italy (7.51%), UAE 
(6.8%), Korea (6.42%), France (6.25%), Russia (5.33%), India (3.42%), Brazil (3.41%) 
and Japan (3.4%) 
Even if U.S. exports to a target country (direct and through third countries) are down as a 
result of sanctions, what is the actual loss to the U.S.? Depending on the composition of 
the goods previously exported to the country, it is possible that these same goods may be 
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exported to some other countries, albeit at a slightly lower price. If this is the case, the 
loss in export revenues, jobs, and wages may be minimal. Moreover, even if the loss in 
exports to the target is not compensated by exports to other countries, some of the goods 
otherwise exported to it could be consumed domestically in the United States, or the 
inputs could be redirected to produce other goods for the U.S. While such redirection 
involves losses of efficiency compared to the market-determined path of exports to target 
countries, it is important to note that export losses through sanctions will be offset to a 
significant extent by redirection of production and inputs. 
On the import side for the United States, what does the loss of imports from target 
countries mean? If the U.S. can buy the same goods at the same price from other 
countries, there is no loss. However, if that is not the case, prices in the U.S. will 
increase, imposing a classical deadweight loss (from trade reduction) on the U.S. The size 
and nature of this loss and its implication may be very different from that of a loss in 
foreign exchange earnings associated with lower exports. 
For the target country, similar considerations will determine the cost of U.S. sanctions on 
their merchandise exports and imports with the U.S. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that aggregate trade models have significant 
limitations in assessing the economic effect of trade sanctions on particular countries. 
Thus, to get a more comprehensive and detailed picture of how trade sanctions work, we 
now examine the impact of sanctions on Iran. Such a detailed examination permits us to 
identify and assess the range of effects of sanctions that go beyond direct merchandise 
trade and provide a clearer picture of merchandise trade as well. 
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While Iran, as any single country with its own special characteristics, may be seen as 
unique, the results still carry a powerful lesson. Namely, the impact of sanctions other 
than those affecting bilateral trade may impose a much higher cost than trade-related 
sanctions on the target country and the U.S., and their adverse effects may continue for a 
long time after all sanctions are lifted. If unchecked, the proliferation of U.S. sanctions 
may pose an ever-increasing and serious burden on the international, economic, and 
financial interests of the United States. 
Direct merchandise trade between the U.S. and Iran has declined significantly because of 
sanctions, but the trade impact has been limited. As for Iran's exports, its oil revenues 
have been very little affected by sanctions; and its non-oil exports, while modestly 
affected, are not a total loss because some of the goods may have been diverted to other 
countries and some may have been consumed domestically. As for its imports, Iran can 
buy most of the goods previously imported from the U.S. from other countries and has 
continued to import many U.S. goods, especially through Dubai (albeit at a twenty 
percent markup). Only the higher cost of U.S. imports through third countries, because of 
the markup, is a real out-of-pocket cost to Iran. However, to the extent that sanctions 
have had a deleterious effect on Iran, this has been indirect and through other channels. 
These include higher financing costs, retarded or stalled oil and non-oil joint venture 
projects (which, in turn, have impeded oil capacity developmen t and thus possibly 
reduced oil production and oil exports), and the like. Moreover, non-quantifiable, longer-
term indirect effects of sanctions may turn out to be the most significant effect of 
sanctions. 
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D- CONCLUSION 
Over a period of twenty years, U.S. sanctions on Iran have had a significant economic 
cost for the U.S. as well as for Iran. Direct merchandise trade between the U.S. and Iran 
has declined significantly, but the real cost of sanctions to each country is not a result of 
reduced bilateral trade, since much of this trade has been diverted to third countries. What 
net loss in trade remains should be viewed more precisely as purely a loss in foreign 
exchange. The real cost of sanctions for both countries is a result of impeded FDI, missed 
joint venture opportunities, and broken financial relationships. These costs are likely to 
accrue even after sanctions are lifted, while bilateral direct trade may be restored much 
more quickly. 
International business is much more than merchandise trade. It is built on deep-rooted 
business relations. It is nurtured by continual contact and dialogue. It grows from dreams 
into projects designed and developed by would-he partners from around the globe. It is 
financed by financial relationships supported by partners from a number of countries. The 
realization of such projects in turn results in FDI, in technology transfer, in increased 
trade in goods and services, and in the sharing of profits. Even when sanctions are 
removed, in many cases economic relations will not go back to where they were before 
the imposition of sanctions. The legacy of broken economic and financial relations can 
take many years to repair and re-establish. 
Sanctions are one of the many ways that countries interfere with international trade and 
finance. When countries use tariffs or traditional non-tariff barriers (NTBs), their goal is 
limited to affecting some aspect of international economic or financial relationship with 
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the target. In the case of sanctions, a non-traditional NTB, the goals are usually much 
more ambitious--to inflict adverse economic conditions on the target (in turn causing a 
fundamental change in policies, a change in government, and more). But invariably there 
is little or no connection between the instrument (the sanction) and the policy goal. 
Sanctions are thus a shotgun approach to international economic, financial, and political 
relations. 
While the imposition of tariffs or NTBs usually invites retaliation and is thus avoided, in 
the case of sanctions retaliation by the target is hardly mentioned. The practical reason 
for this blind spot is that only the United States uses this instrument frequently, and the 
countries that are its target are invariably either not in a position to retaliate or the 
significance of their retaliation is small or underestimated. Thus, while economists warn 
against the dangers of tariffs and NTBs, little is said about the dangers of sanctions. But 
sanctions impose a significant cost on the U.S. as well as on target countries. These costs 
are underestimated for a number of reasons, including the fact that estimates usually 
incorporate only the reduction in direct merchandise trade (ignoring services, costs of 
capital, FDI, other capital flows etc.), the assumption that sanctions have an effect only 
while they are in force (the residual effect after the lifting of sanctions is not taken into 
account), and neglect of t he impact on long-term business relations with the target and 
with third countries (such as reducing the perceived reliability of U.S. firms). 
The success of sanctions is exaggerated because policies in target countries are likely to 
change eventually because of internal political dynamics not necessarily related to U.S. 
sanctions. The attractiveness of sanctions for U.S. politicians is that they do not cost U.S. 
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lives, their cost is somewhat hidden (requiring no budgetary allocation), they do not make 
daily headlines, and success can always be claimed to be around the corner. 
The experience with sanctions on Iran confirms much of the above. The United States 
was frustrated with Iran, and U.S. politicians wanted to appear "tough" with Iran. This 
has led to a policy of continually escalating sanctions over a period of roughly twenty 
years. While sanctions have impacted direct bilateral merchandise trade (largely losses in 
foreign exchange only), the non-trade impact of sanctions, which will continue to accrue 
even after sanctions are lifted, appears to be much more important because it represents a 
real cost to both sides. 
It is most important to note that the objectionable policies that are presumably followed 
by Iran have not changed. There is little indication of any impact on Iranian policies 
except that U.S.-Iranian business relations are likely to be adversely affected for some 
time. The same can be said for Cuba and other sanctioned countries. 
For the future, the United States may become more restricted in its use of economic 
sanctions. More and more countries can be expected to join the WTO, and the 
significance of the WTO in global trade and finance should increase. Thus, unilateral 
sanctions could invoke costly WTO sanctions in return. More and more countries could 
also join regional trading blocs, increasing the cost of sanctions to the U.S. Better data 
and more comprehensive studies may convince the U.S. electorate (and in turn U.S. 
politicians) that sanctions are not usually a cost-effective policy option. Finally, we 
propose that future U.S. policy will require a sanction impact study for all proposed 
sanctions. This will force politicians to think through their expected chain of events and 
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to comprehensively address the costs and benefits of sanctions, while affording a useful 
benchmark to assess the success or failure of sanctions. 
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CHAPTER 4- CONCLUSION  
Iran-US relations have disrupted since the revolution in Iran. After that, Iran has 
experienced different crises. These include the eight-year war with Iraq, the assassination 
of prominent revolutionary leaders, the death of Imam Khomeini, and the international 
embargo led by the United States. However, the Iranian state has proved its ability to 
survive all these storms. For the past years, the majority of action taken by the United 
States and its Western allies with respect to Iran has been sanctions, harsh and 
inflammatory rhetoric, and political isolation, all of which have proven ineffective in 
making Iran a contributing member of the international community.  
However, everybody knows the United State is a great power in the world and affect 
other countries by different policies. Now it is time to think about and reconsider our 
relations deeply and reasonably with the great powers. The world has changed and other 
power states like China altered their national policy even in their fundamental policies 
and values. They adapted new approach in the globalization era.  
According to basic indicators, which mentioned in chapter three, we should reevaluate 
our foreign policy with the US. Lacking relation with this superpower has many costs for 
Iran. As we mentioned, there are many reason for this. From the U.S. perspective, Iran 
sponsors international terrorism, persuade the weapons of mass destruction, is threats to 
neighbors in the Persian Gulf, is a opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, violates 
of human rights. On Iran's side, United States has not righ underestaning on Iran and  
demands that the United States accept the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution, not interfere 
in Iran's internal affairs, and deal with the Iranian regime on the basis of "respect and 
equality." Subsequent demands by Iran are as follow, lifting U.S. economic sanctions, 
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release of frozen Iranian assets in the United States, removal of the U.S. Navy from the 
Persian Gulf, an end to one-sided support for Israel, a formal apology for Washington's 
past misdeeds. 
 
With no doubt political and economic cooperation would not be successful without 
preparing a security framework. In other words, Iran needs to demonstrate a predictable 
and confident foreign policy behavior, based on a common consensus among domestic 
policy makers. The consensus leads managing a kind of behavior in international arena 
that has a specific framework and stable rules. Domestic political stability is a pre-
condition for consensus making in the area of foreign policy. The geopolitical and geo-
economics characteristic of Iran have a special condition that it cannot form regional 
coalition without organizing its relations and communication with the global power 
centers. 
As the years passed, policy of confrontation has failed. It seems that establishing a 
cooperative framework on issues of mutual interests, especially on nonpolitical ones will be 
productive. The two countries may intensify people-to-people exchange, including cultural 
academic, athletic and political ones. The US may encourage Iran to make practical 
contributions to peacemaking efforts along the lines of its activity in UN non-proliferation 
committees, Iraq and Afghanistan crises. They may develop and fund joint programs to 
promote small and medium-size private enterprises, strengthen democratic structures and 
civil society at communal level, particularly in areas deemed less politically sensitive such as 
urban development, traffic and deforestation. The US should lift such opposition as continues 
to Iran’s entering negotiations aimed at joining the World Trade Organization to encourage 
the kinds of economic reforms. The US should leave all offensive behaviors regarding 
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Iranians such as finger- printing in its airports. Iran’s government should plan to promote 
public living standards with better situation in domestic policy and other area. 
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